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Administrative Law:
Historical Origins of America’s Administrative Exceptionalism
Reuel Schiller1
Students of comparative administrative law have long noted two
things about the American administrative state that differentiates it
from those of other advanced industrial democracies: the American
administrative state is underdeveloped, and independent courts and
legalistic behavior by regulators have an outsized influence on
American regulatory policy.
This article argues that these two phenomena are products of the
American historical experience. In particular, the dimensions of the
contemporary regulatory state result from a combination of
ideological, political, and institutional factors. Ideologically,
American political culture contains contradictory attitudes towards
the state. Throughout American history Americans embraced a
strong, “positive” state. At the same time, a powerful current of
laissez-faire hostility towards the state permeates American political
culture. This unstable ideological bedrock is the foundation upon
which the modern American regulatory state is built.
The political factors that shaped the rise of the administrative
state in the United States were similar to those felt in all
industrializing countries. The growth and dislocation caused by rapid
industrialization led to political demands for the increased regulation
and control of the emergent capitalist order. In the United States,
however, these political impulses were filtered through and
dampened by a national government with a particular set of
institutional structures. Thus, the demands for regulation and other
forms of state intervention were weakened by both the ideological
ambivalence of American political culture towards the state, and
obstructive institutional mechanisms. Ultimately, this ideological
ambivalence and institutional resistance combined in the form of
judicial control of the administrative process.

1. Summarized and excerpted from Reuel Schiller, The Historical
Origins of American Regulatory Exceptionalism, in COMPARATIVE LAW
AND REGULATION (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds. 2016).
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The Stunted Development of the American Administrative State
The growth of the American administrative state has been
constant. Every decade of American history has seen political crises
that have generated impulses towards regulation. In antebellum
America, courts shaped common-law doctrines to promote economic
growth, while states, localities, and, to a lesser extent, the federal
government developed administrative mechanisms to protect the
public welfare from the negative effects of such growth. The years
between the Civil War and the Great Depression saw a dramatic
growth of administrative institutions at both the state and federal
level, as the American state responded to the dislocating effects of
rapid industrialization and corporate consolidation. The Great
Depression generated another round of regulatory innovation,
resulting in many of the administrative entities that form of the core
of our modern administrative and welfare state. Similarly, political
and social reform movements of postwar America yielded regulatory
mechanisms for furthering reform goals, be they the promoting of
equal employment opportunity or a cleaner environment. More
recently, economic crises have once again generated regulatory
impulses, creating new regulations for banking and securities
markets.
While this growth of the administrative state has been dramatic,
the peculiar institutional structure of the United States has inhibited
it. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, judicial
resistance under the guise of substantive due process was one
limitation. Institutional obstacles imposed other, more persistent,
limits. The American state is structured in such a way as to impede
the development of national administrative institutions. Federalism,
the requirements of bicameralism, and the customs and rules of the
Senate fostered a form of political localism that made creating
national regulatory regimes difficult.
This fact was compounded by the extraordinary power of locallyoriented political parties. Few politicians had much interest in
creating national institutions that might undermine their power. Thus,
rather than developing a tradition of bureaucratic governance, as was
the case in Europe, the American administrative state developed as a
piecemeal response to particular political pressures, processed
through governmental institutions that themselves limited the
effectiveness of regulatory policies.
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This was particularly obvious during the New Deal. Lack of
existing institutional capacity frequently required the administration
to regulate through existing, often private, structures. Sometimes, as
with the Security and Exchange Commission’s regulation of stock
exchanges, doing so was successful. Other times, as with the
National Recovery Administration’s dependence on industry boards,
it was a disaster.
Additionally, federalism, bicameralism and the disproportionate
power of southern politicians due to one-party rule in the South lead
to the devolution of public assistance programs and many regulatory
regimes to state and local actors. This limited the effectiveness of
many administrative programs. Southern politicians were not going
to allow the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations
Act, or the Social Security Act to upset the racial hierarchy in their
state by lessening African American economic dependence on local
whites. Similarly, state and local implementation of social-welfare
programs was shaped both by that same impulse and by a genuine
lack of state capacity. The only way to quickly implement a publicassistance program in a country with a comparatively small federal
bureaucracy was to enlist state and local officials into the process,
even if doing so meant that some policies would be carried out in a
manner that was less than fully effective.
Indeed, even modern regulatory innovations bear the
characteristics of the underdeveloped American state. They still have
a patchwork feel, as if they are haphazard intruders into a “natural”
world of private ordering. Many are still highly contested in the
political arena, and are thus frequently hampered by aggressive
political oversight. For some, the involvement of states required by
federalism has created inefficiencies. Most significantly, all of them
are weakened by the United States’ commitment to an outsized
judicial role in the regulatory processes. This manifests itself in two
ways. The first is the intensity with which courts oversee the
administrative process. The second is the fact that both Congress and
the courts have forced regulatory actors to act in a proceduralized,
judicial manner. Agencies must behave like little courts, complete
with procedures that inhibit efficiency in order to protect the rights of
individuals from the power of the state. This is the final stop in
historicizing the exceptionalism of the American regulatory state.
Why are courts and court-like behavior so central to American
regulation?
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Courts and the Administrative State
The modern conception of judicial review dates from the
beginning of the twentieth century. It was then that courts divided
any given administrative action into findings of fact, interpretations
of law, and the application of law to facts. “Pure” issues of law were
to be decided by courts, while factual findings and the application of
law were done by the agency, subject to some form of intermediate
scrutiny by the judiciary. Courts would review whether
administrative action was an “abuse of discretion”; whether it was
‘reasonable”; and whether it was supported by “substantial
evidence.” Each of these standards sought to subject administrative
action to a form of judicial monitoring that sat somewhere between
absolute passivity and de novo review.
Nor was the emergence of the appellate model of judicial review
the only manifestation of judicial meddling with the regulatory
process. The twentieth century also saw the increasing judicialization
of regulatory entities themselves. Regardless of how intense judicial
review of administrative action was, the agencies themselves were to
behave in a judicial fashion. Their decisions should be made in an
adversarial proceeding, with evidentiary records, independent
adjudicators, and a chance for the parties to appear and confront the
agency officials who would regulate them. This tendency is most
obvious in the passage of the federal and state administrative
procedure acts, all of which imposed these sorts of court-like
requirements on agency adjudications. The due-process cases of the
1960s similarly judicialized many informal agency actions. In the
1970s, federal courts transformed even that least judicial of
regulatory actions—issuing regulations—into an adversarial process
by imposing a series of quasi-adjudicatory requirements on agency
rulemakers: detailed notice, decisions based on a record, agency
disclosure of data, and agency responses to cogent comments by the
regulated. Thus, over the course of the twentieth century, courts
developed a distinctive role in the American regulatory process.
Indeed, even outside of the confines of judicial review, twentiethcentury administrative law expected agencies to behave like courts.
Timing and legitimacy help explain the rise of judicial review
and the judicialization of the administrative process. Courts asserted
their control over the administrative process at the beginning of the
twentieth century, just as the administrative state was becoming
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national in scale and broader in the subjects it regulated. Thus, the
rise of judicial control of the administrative process related to issues
of legitimacy. To the extent that the vast majority of administrative
entities in the nineteenth century were local and state bodies
regulating in areas that were traditionally thought of as subject to
government regulation, the administrative state’s legitimacy went
unquestioned. Indeed, such regulation was legitimated by its
connection to local, community norms. Regulation was thus
legitimated by tradition. It was woven into the fabric of local
communities.
With the growth of national administrative structures and with
the expansion of the palate of regulatory subject matters, this basis
for legitimacy disappeared, and people went looking for others. They
found these new sources of legitimacy in the courts. Since colonial
times, American political culture assigned to common-law courts and
the lawyers who practiced before them a special role in the protection
of individual rights against the state. The legal profession’s job was
to act as a buffer between the state and society, defending liberty and
the rule of law. To assist lawyers in this task were some traditional
mechanisms—juries and the common law—and distinctly American
institutional innovations, especially judicial independence, judicial
review, and separation of powers. Thus, with the rise of national
bureaucratic structures in the late nineteenth century, it is not
surprising that lawyers and courts would be enlisted in the defense of
traditional liberties against the new leviathan. What better way to
protect individuals from the arbitrary power of the regulatory state
than to ensure that courts and lawyers sat atop that state, and to
demand that agencies behave as much like courts as possible?
Conclusion
Judicial review is thus the final element in the story of the
historical origins of American regulatory exceptionalism. Its basis in
the idea that courts and lawyers have a special role in protecting
individual liberty connects it with the laissez-faire ideology that is
prevalent in American political culture. Its rise also identifies it as yet
another institutional characteristic of American government that has
the effect of limiting the strong regulatory impulses that have
frequently emerged from American society. A political victory
establishing a new regulatory regime could easily be undermined by
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judicial oversight or the proceduralization of the administrative
process.
The story of the weak American administrative state and the
prevalence of judicial control of the administrative processes are thus
linked. They also sit within the same ideological medium: an
American political culture where a commitment to laissez-faire
principles is in constant struggle with both republican communal
values and the felt political necessities of responding to the
dislocations caused by a modern, capitalist economy. The policy
impulses that flow out of this complex, contradictory political culture
are themselves warped and dampened by American institutional
arrangements. Intense judicial review, the proceduralization of the
administrative process, the divisions of government power, and the
persistent localism of the dominant political parties combine to make
regulatory action, particularly at the national level, difficult.

